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Letter to the EditorFinal  response  to  Thomas  and  VaughanIn issue 93 of this journal, Thomas and Vaughan (TV) provide
a detailed reply to our comments on their paper ‘Testing
the validity of the “value of a prevented fatality” (VPF) used
to assess UK safety measures’ – see Thomas and Vaughan
(2014b), Chilton et al. (2014) and Thomas and Vaughan (2014a).
While we  have no intention of engaging in an ongoing debate
with TV over judgemental issues such as the appropriateness
(or otherwise) of trimming suspect “outlier” responses in a
stated-preference study, we do believe that it is important to
point out various factual errors and misrepresentations in their
reply to our comments.
Most signiﬁcantly, TV argue that when we  refer to the use of
a “positive exponential utility of wealth function” as a means
of dealing with a situation in which an individual’s willing-
ness to pay response exceeds his/her willingness to accept
response, we  are effectively deﬁning the utility function as
U(w) = −e−ˇw with  ˇ < 0. As TV themselves point out, this speci-
ﬁcation would imply that utility is a strictly decreasing function
of wealth, which is completely unacceptable. In addition,
although TV do not point this out, in order to accommodate
the willingness to pay and willingness to accept responses
for a given injury, with TV’s speciﬁcation it would be neces-
sary to have I(w) = U(w) +  ˛ with  ˛ > 0, where I(w) is the utility of
wealth conditional on suffering the injury, which implies that
I(w)  > U(w). Insertion of the graph of I(w) in Fig. 1 of TV’s reply
clearly indicates that this is the case. Plainly, the requirement
that I(w) > U(w) is also completely unacceptable unless one is
aiming to analyse the preferences of those with masochistic
tendencies, which is certainly not our objective!
But TV’s interpretation of what we  mean by a “positive
exponential utility of wealth function” is, in fact, completely
mistaken. As we  believe should be obvious to any reader who
is following our argument, what we actually mean by the “pos-
itive exponential” speciﬁcation is that U(w) = eˇw with  ˇ > 0.
Clearly, given this speciﬁcation, utility is a strictly increasing,
convex function of wealth. With the utility of wealth condi-
tional on suffering the injury speciﬁed as I(w) = U(w) −  ˛ with
 ˛ > 0, so that U(w) > I(w), it is then possible to accommodate
those somewhat anomalous cases in which a respondent’s
willingness to pay for a complete cure for the injury exceeds
the sum he/she requires as compensation for suffering the
DOI of original article:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.11.003.injury. As we note below, it is entirely possible that other
speciﬁcations of the respondent’s utility of wealth function
might apply for levels of wealth outside the range of values
over which our analysis is carried out, so that we  are in no
way constraining the respondent’s utility of wealth function
to be convex over all levels of wealth, which would be quite
unreasonable.
As it happens, according U(w) the wrong sign (as in TV’s
misspeciﬁcation of the positive exponential utility function)
and setting I(w) = U(w) +  ˛ with  ˛ > 0 is equivalent to multiplying
both sides of each of the equations numbered (A.14) in Thomas
and Vaughan (2014a) by −1. More speciﬁcally, TV’s equations
(A.14) correctly indicate that an individual’s willingness to pay
and willingness to accept responses, x and y, should satisfy the
conditions: U(w¯ − x) = U(w¯) −  ˛ and U(w¯ + y) −  ˛ = U(w¯), with
 ˛ > 0. Under our deﬁnition of the positive exponential utility
function and our speciﬁcation of the relationship between
I(w) and U(w), (i.e. U(w) = eˇw with  ˇ > 0 and I(w) = U(w) −  ˛ with
 ˛ > 0), then with  ˛ and  ˇ set at appropriate levels, these condi-
tions can clearly be met  for those cases in which x > y. However,
TV’s equations (A.14) can quite legitimately be transformed
by multiplying both sides of each equation by −1, in which
case they become: −U(w¯ − x) = −U(w¯) +  ˛ and −U(w¯ + y) +  ˛ =
−U(w¯), with  ˛ > 0. Given that TV’s misinterpretation of what
we actually mean by the “positive exponential” speciﬁca-
tion of U(w) effectively involves setting the function equal to
−U(w) and also setting I(w) = −U(w) +  ˛ with  ˛ > 0, then these
patently unacceptable speciﬁcations will, somewhat paradox-
ically, also satisfy the legitimately transformed versions of
TV’s equations (A.14).
It therefore turns out that the two unacceptable features
of TV’s mistaken interpretation of what we  mean by the “pos-
itive exponential” speciﬁcation effectively cancel each other
out in the mathematical derivation of the expression for an
individual’s marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of
suffering the injury for those cases in which a respondent’s
willingness to pay exceeds his/her willingness to accept. Con-
sequently, the way in which TV deal with such cases actually
produces the same result as we obtained using what we mean
by the “positive exponential” speciﬁcation. This explains why
the ﬁgures that TV arrive at on the basis of their incorrect
interpretation and report in their Table 1 are effectively the
same as those that we  obtained using our legitimate speciﬁca-
tion of the positive exponential utility function. TV’s approach
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Chilton, S., Covey, J., Jones-Lee, M., Loomes, G., Pidgeon, N.,herefore rather parallels a situation in which, when aiming
o calculate the time that it takes for a stone to reach the
round after it is dropped from the top of a 400 ft building,
ne assumes (a) that the object accelerates upwards at a rate
f 32 ft/s2 and b) that the top of the building is 400 ft below the
round. While both of the assumptions are patently false, one
ould nonetheless reach the correct conclusion that the stone
ould reach the ground in 5 s.
Clearly then, the speciﬁcation U(w) = -e−ˇw with  ˇ < 0 that
V claim we  applied in order to deal with cases in which a
espondent’s willingness to pay exceeds his/her willingness
o accept (and which they appear to have used in order to
btain their results reported in Table 1 of their reply) does
ot fall into either the category that we  classiﬁed as “posi-
ive exponential”, i.e. U(w) = eˇw with  ˇ > 0, or the form that
e classiﬁed as “negative exponential”, i.e. U(w) = −e−ˇw with
 > 0. As we said in our response, if TV had done the rele-
ant calculation for those cases in which willingness to pay
xceeds willingness to accept then they would have realised
hat they were completely mistaken in their claim that we
btained our results using the negative exponential speciﬁca-
ion. In the event, the calculation that TV actually performed
as totally irrelevant and based on a speciﬁcation of U(w) and
he relationship between I(w) and U(w) that are both totally
nacceptable, viewed from an economic perspective.
TV’s second fundamental error is their claim that when we
efer to the use of a “linear” utility of wealth function we  are
etting U(w) = −e−ˇw with  ˇ = 0, so that U(w) = −1 and is hence
onstant, which is plainly unacceptable. But TV’s interpreta-
ion of what we  mean by a “linear” utility of wealth function
s also completely mistaken. As we believe should be self-
vident, what we  actually mean by a “linear” speciﬁcation is
hat U(w) = a + bw with b > 0. Setting I(w) = U(w) −  ˛ with  ˛ > 0 it
s then possible to accommodate those cases involving equal
illingness to pay and willingness to accept responses. But
ne is then bound to wonder quite how TV managed to com-
ute the values that they report in Table 1 of their reply for
hose cases involving non-zero, equal willingness to pay and
illingness to accept responses. In particular, as they them-
elves point out in their paper, with  ˇ = 0 their Eq. (B.36) is
napplicable in such cases. Based on Eq. (B.37) in their paper,
he answer would appear to be that they have computed
he relevant marginal rates of substitution as the limit of the
xpression in their Eq. (B.36) as  ˇ → 0 from above. But with ˇ
ositive and close to zero, the negative exponential utility of
ealth function U(w) = −e−ˇw will be very nearly linear over
lausible levels of wealth and will also be strictly increasing,
o that TV have effectively computed their marginal rates of
ubstitution using what we mean by the “linear” speciﬁcation
f U(w).
Next, we  turn to TV’s claim that with the utility function
eﬁned as U(w) = F(w − ˇ), then  ˇ constitutes the “wealth the
ndividual feels he needs before it brings him any utility” and
hat  ˇ must therefore take the same value for all speciﬁcations
f the function F(.). TV then argue that since  ˇ is set equal to
ero for the negative exponential speciﬁcation, it must there-
ore necessarily be set equal to zero for all three of the other
peciﬁcations that we apply, which then yields ridiculously
ow implied levels of wealth.
But when we  deﬁne the utility function as U(w) = F(w − ˇ)
hen, as we  point out clearly in footnote 3 of our response,
e intend that any particular speciﬁcation of the function F(.)hat we  use should apply only for levels of wealth, w, such thatw ≥ w¯ − x, where w¯ is the individual’s initial wealth and x is the
amount that he/she is willing to pay for a complete cure. The
key point is then that, as we again emphasise in our footnote
3, other speciﬁcations of the function F(.) can quite legiti-
mately be applied for levels of wealth such that w < w¯ − x.
Given that in the logarithmic and negative inverse speciﬁca-
tions it can be shown that  ˇ < w¯ − x, while in the constrained
power case  ˇ = w¯ −  x, it is therefore clear that utility can be
perfectly well-deﬁned for levels of wealth that are less than
 ˇ simply by applying other speciﬁcations of F(.) for w < w¯ −  x.
The fact that the other speciﬁcations of F(.) required to deal
with such levels of wealth may entail negative levels of utility
is completely irrelevant, given that the utility functions under-
pinning Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory
can legitimately be subjected to any positive afﬁne transfor-
mation. The absolute magnitude of U(w) – and, in particular,
whether it is positive or negative – is therefore of no conse-
quence, and all that actually matters is how U(w) varies with
w and how U(w) relates to I(w). This point is clearly illustrated
by the fact that under the negative exponential speciﬁca-
tion, U(w) is strictly negative (with I(w) < U(w)), for all levels
of w.
TV’s claim that  ˇ constitutes the minimum level of wealth
that brings the individual any utility and that  ˇ must be set
equal to zero for all speciﬁcations of the function F(.) is there-
fore quite simply wrong.  As a result, TV are also completely
mistaken in concluding that the levels of wealth implied by
our analysis are absurdly low. It is also worth noting that since
the application of a horizontal shift parameter to the negative
exponential utility of wealth function is equivalent to multi-
plication of the function by a positive constant – which would
have no effect whatsoever on the results we derive – there is
absolutely no reason why the horizontal shift parameter must
be set at zero for the negative exponential speciﬁcation, as TV
seem to believe is necessarily the case.
Finally, TV state that “It is not even clear that the authors of
the Carthy study collected the wealth data needed to justify a
survey-based VPF”. While we  certainly did not have the temer-
ity to question respondents about their overall wealth, we  did
collect (and still have access to) demographic data concerning
income, age and social class and this indicates quite clearly
that our sample was broadly representative. TV also have an
error in the ﬁrst line of Table 1 of their reply in which they
report the VPF from the Carthy et al. study for respondent 6 as
£713,715, whereas the ﬁgure in the data set that we provided
was in fact £713,175.
In summary, Thomas and Vaughan’s proclivity for misinter-
pretation and misrepresentation is again clearly exempliﬁed
by their reply to our comments on their paper. Given their
apparent inability to engage in a balanced and reasonable
debate on the issue concerned, we shall desist from any fur-
ther correspondence concerning their criticisms of the Carthy
et al. (1999) paper.
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